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Social experimentation with random assignment is unique to the
United States as an approach to public policy research. As far as I can
determine, no other Western countries have conducted social experi-
ments with a randomly assigned group. In the United States, we have
now had sufficient experience with this form of policy research that it is
appropriate to take a hard look at its conduct and its usefulness in the
governmental process.
This paper examines the income maintenance experiments and their
implications for social policy and for future research. Each topic is in-
troduced by a section on their lessons for the history of applied social
science. To organize the material I have adopted the approach recom-
mended by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May.1 They urge policy
analysts to draw on the historical record to answer three questions:
What is known? What is unclear? What is presumed?
Before proceeding, it is necessary to add a comment about the point
of view I bring to this analysis. As a former government official involved
in the development of Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, I have come to
the conclusion that the Plan was a mistake. I believe the mistakes made
in developing and advocating the Family Assistance Plan were a result
of its heavy dependence on the idea of the negative income tax, which
was riding high in the public policy research and analysis community at
the time Nixon’s plan originated.
As regards the second main topic considered in this paper -- the
research implications of the negative income tax experiments -- I have a
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bias in favor of large, systematic demonstration research projects to test
possible new policies, conducted on a basis that involves the random
assignment of participants to treatment and control groups. However, I
have considerable reservations about the negative income tax experi-
ments. I believe demonstrations of new service-type policies are more
likely to produce useful results for government policymakers than
demonstrations to test universal income-transfer initiatives.
Lessons and Implications for Social Policy
When a new policy is tested, ideally we would like to know about its
macroeconomic effects and its microeconomic effects. But economic
effects are not the whole story. A public policy change like the negative
income tax would be expected to have social and psychological effects as
well. For recipients, it could increase or diminish self-esteem, work or
school motivation, health, and happiness. Likewise, it could affect the
happiness -- call it a feeling of altruism or a sense of security -- of a com-
munity, a neighborhood, or the society as a whole. In the past, these
social and psychological dimensions of the effects of policy change often
have been left out in the conceptualization and planning of social ex-
periments. In addition, we are likely to be interested in the political and
institutional effects of a potential new policy being tested in a social ex-
periment. How would a negative income tax affect the managerial
capacity, finances, and relative roles of different levels of government
and different types of public and private agencies and organizations?
The negative income tax experiments were launched in the late sixties
at a time when economics was riding high as the lead discipline for
applied social science in government in the United States. As a result, it
is not surprising that economic effects, specifically labor market effects,
were highlighted in the design and execution of the experiments.2 This
emphasis is reflected in the discussion which follows, using the
Neustadt-May approach in examining the history of what is known,
unclear, and presumed from the experiments.
What Is Known?
When the debate about the Family Assistance Plan was at its peak in
the U.S. Senate in 1970, officials in the Nixon administration, in a move
that is still debated, issued a "preliminary" report on the results of ~the
New Jersey negative income tax experiments. This report described the
effects of the plan tested in New Jersey on work incentives for adults in
two-parent low-income families. This issue of the work-incentive effect
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policy in the United States. Observing the British Poor Laws in 1766,
Benjamin Franklin summed up his reaction: "In short, you offered a
premium for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now
wonder that it has had its effect in the increase of poverty.’’3
The conclusion of the 1970 preliminary report on the results of the
New Jersey experiments was that Benjamin Franklin was wrong. There
was no work-disincentive effect in the early New Jersey returns. Senator
John Williams, Republican of Delaware, at this juncture called on the
General Accounting Office to "audit" these results. Its finding was that
this report by the Office of Economic Opportunity was "premature,"
which clearly it was.4 Later findings showed that there was a labor-
supply cost to the experiments. This work-disincentive effect was found
to be greatest for women heading single-parent welfare families in the
Seattle-Denver experiments, although it also showed up for men in two-
parent families in both the New Jersey and Seattle-Denver experiments.
Gary Burtless and Robert H. Haveman concluded: "The Seattle-Denver
experiment has played a useful role in overturning the notion, especially
popular among economists and idealistic reformers, that lower marginal
tax rates are automatically associated with a greater stimulus to work.’’5
The Seattle-Denver experiments also showed that the negative in-
come tax plan they encompassed tended to have an adverse effect on
family formation and to encourage family breakup.6 These findings,
along with the labor market findings and their cost implications dis-
cussed below, weakened the case for this type of welfare reform,
especially during the Carter administration.
What Is Unclear?
Even if we know about the labor market effects of a negative income
tax, this does not necessarily mean that we can generalize about these
effects as they apply to a new and widely publicized national scheme.
The reason for this is that we do not know how the adoption of a
"guaranteed-income" program would be interpreted by the eligible
population. This is the issue of external validity. We are interested in
this connection in how such a universal, broad-gauged policy change
would affect the tastes of society as a whole. It is in these terms that the
Coyle-Wildavsky paper for this conference discusses the cultural dimen-
sion of policy change. Would a negative income tax be seen as govern-
mental support for added leisure?7 Such an outcome could accentuate
the labor disincentive effect, which as just noted was found to have
occurred in the New Jersey and Seattle-Denver experiments.
At an April 1974 Brookings conference on the New Jersey ex-
periments, Peter H. Rossi presented a paper on the non-labor-force
responses to the experiments.8 Rossi said it was paradoxical that,248 Richard P. Nathan
despite the heavy reliance of sociologists on the collection of primary
data and the extensive use by psychologists of experimental designs, it
was economists who "played the major role in designing and fielding
the income maintenance experiment."9 The result, said Rossi, is that we
know very little from the experiments about the noneconomic effects of
a negative income tax on individuals, although these effects were often
presumed by the sponsors of the research.
On a general basis, Thomas Pettigrew has expressed concern about
the neglect of the psychological dimension in poverty research. 10 He has
commented, for example, on the psychological concept of "learned
helplessness as an unintended, but important, possible consequence of
transfer payments." A similar point is reflected in the current social
policy criticism of conservatives like Charles Murray, who writes about
how the dependency effects of welfare programs have undermined the
self-image of recipients.11
What Is Presumed?
The most important presumption (for purposes of this paper) made
by the sponsors of the experiments is reflected in the point made by
Rossi, that the sponsors assumed that if the negative income tax
"worked" in the labor market, the case for it on other grounds was a
strong one. In doing this, the sponsors of the experiments failed to take
adequate account of fundamental political and strategic issues related to
the idea of a negative income tax. I discuss these issues in the section
that follows.
Implications for Social Policy
The main effect of the income maintenance experiments was to
educate government participants as well as the media and interested
citizens on the policy issues raised by the idea of a negative income tax.
Controversies arose in the Nixon period about the workoincentive effects
of the experiments, and in the Carter period about their cost and their
effect on family breakup. The educational process that ensued was ex-
pensive and sowed seeds of doubt about an idea that originally had been
seen as a bold solution for many of the nation’s social ills.
The economic conundrum of the negative income tax is
demonstrated if we set the income guarantee at an "adequate" or
"near-adequate" level for families and then want to have a marginal
reduction rate in the 50 to 60 percent range. The added cost of such a
plan, if its coverage is comprehensive and its rate structure a smooth
curve (that is, un-notched), is bound to be very large -- on the order of
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such large additional amounts of money to a redistributive scheme for
the working-age, able-bodied poor, the negative income tax approach
was not in 1969 (and is not today) a feasible national policy option.
Presidents Nixon and Carter both gave evidence of understanding
this issue, at least intuitively. From the outset, Nixon stressed that the
Family Assistance Plan was not a guaranteed income. The work require-
ment was to be serious and enforced. His plan also included a substan-
tial amount of money for public service jobs for eligible family heads for
whom suitable jobs were not available elsewhere. President Carter went
even further in his welfare reform scheme, which like Nixon’s embodied
negative income tax features. He advocated a guaranteed (or close to
guaranteed) job for eligible heads of welfare families for whom regular
employment was not available.
The essence of the Nixon position, the Carter position, and even
more so the Reagan position, is: Money alone is not the answer. The
negative income tax approach, grounded in neoclassical economics, was
never a comfortable one for most politicians.
One wonders in this context why the experiments were undertaken.
Were they a delaying tactic supported by political officials who resisted
this approach to welfare reform? Or were they an effort on the part of
proponents of a negative income tax to put their idea on the agenda and
prove that it would work? I think it was the latter. If I am right, then the
issues are: Who should set the agenda for policy research? And, how
should this be done? Experiments are expensive both in budgetary
terms and in terms of their opportunity cost for the social science policy
research community. I believe social experiments should be restricted to situa-
tions in which three conditions apply. Politicians need to be: (1) genuinely
interested in dealing with an issue; (2) uncertain about how to do so; and (3)
willing to co’~sider the approach that is the subject of experimentation. In my
view, the negative income tax experiments did not satisfy these condi-
tions. There are ways, as discussed below, in which these conditions can
be satisfied by social experiments in the welfare policy field.
To summarize, three strands of opinion have dominated the welfare
reform debates over the past 20 years. One is the income strategy
favored by the policy analyst and a few liberal politicians.12 A second
strand in the welfare reform debate is the block grant or devolutionary
position favored by conservatives, with Ronald Reagan in the forefront
both as a governor of California and as President. The third position, the
employment approach to welfare reform, has both liberal and conser-
vative adherents. A jobs component was featured in both the Nixon and
Carter welfare reform plans. The employment approach is also central to
the so-called "workfare" component of Reagan’s approach to welfare
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As the negative income tax or income strategy lost its lustre, new
departures on the employment front have increasingly dominated
policy debates. Under Reagan, employment approaches to welfare
reform are now the subject of new social experiments in many states.
We need to step back and look at the background of Reagan’s position in
order to consider these new work[welfare experiments.
Since the early seventies, the Reagan approach to welfare reform
has specifically rejected the negative income tax concept of setting the
marginal reduction rate for welfare benefits at a level that will stimulate
work effort. In 1981 Reagan was successful in reducing the effect of the
$30 plus one-third deduction for aid to families with dependent children
(AFDC), first enacted in 1967.13 In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Reagan also tried to require states to assign all eligible AFDC
family heads (employable adult recipients with children over six years of
age) to "workfare" jobs, provided child-care was available. Although
Congress would not go along with a compulsory and universal
"workfare" requirement, provisions were included in the 1981 budget
act allowing the states to test the work-for-your-welfare approach as
well as other employment approaches to reducing welfare dependency.
Over two-thirds of the states are now taking advantage of this new
authority under the heading of "workfare." This term has come to have
a broader and more liberal meaning in the 1980s, applying not just to the
work-for-yoUr-welfare idea, but also to new approaches that require
employable heads of welfare families to participate in job placement,
training, and educational services, as well as community employment
programs.
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, based in New
York City, is conducting eight state-based demonstration studies with
random assignment on variations of the "workfare" approach.
Altogether, more than 35,000 people have been assigned either to a con-
trol group or to new programs for job counseling, job preparation, and
community work experience. The results of these demonstrations so far
have been promising, although the earnings and work increases
achieved are not all that large and there is variation among the states in
these terms.14 In effect, the states are serving as testing grounds for the
employment approach to welfare reform, on a basis that I believe
satisfies the three conditions described above and that involves a
delicate political balancing act by liberals and conservatives. The ques-
tion raised by these state workfare initiatives is whether a skillful blend
of new employment-oriented program features and procedures can
avoid the dilemma of welfare reform described by Henry Aaron in 1984.
Looking back at the work requirement of the welfare reform debates of
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The acknowledgement of the need for a work requirement created
an insoluble dilemma, however. With a sufficiently coercive adminis-
trative system, potential welfare recipients could be required to accept
existing low-quality, low-wage jobs in the private sector. If enough
private sector jobs did not exist, public sector positions could be created
at low cost. If a work requirement discouraged enough people from
applying for welfare, costs might even be reduced. But the coercion that
would be necessary to make such a requirement work violated notions
of fairness and rights. Alternatively, the public sector could create jobs
with sufficiently attractive working conditions and wages to reduce
greatly the need for coercion. But the size of the program would be un-
precedented, and its cost would be prohibitive, particularly since many
workers in unattractive private sector jobs would find it expedient to
switch to superior public sector jobs. Trapped on this political Moebius
strip, welfare reform went nowhere.15
Although all the results are not in yet, the work/welfare experiments
show promise of offering a way out of the trap described by Aaron on a
basis that the public and politicians would be likely to favor.
Lessons and Implications for Policy Research
What Is Known?
Bette and Michael Mahoney described the New Jersey negative
income tax experiments as "an experiment in experimentation.’’16 To
the credit of the researchers involved, we learned from those ex-
periments that it is possible in the United States to conduct large-scale,
rigorous, honest demonstration research projects with the random
assignment of participants to treatment and control groups. We also
learned that such research is expensive and that it takes a long time to
conduct. The New Jersey experiment was first proposed by the Office of
Economic Opportunity in 1967. It was conducted from 1968 to 1972.
Reports were issued late in 1973 and in 1974, by which time Nixon’s
Family Assistance Plan had already been abandoned. The Seattle-
Denver experiments were started in 1970 and involved over three times
as many participants as the New Jersey experiments. They took over a
decade to complete.
Both experiments can be said to have worked in research terms. This
is a real achievement when one considers the hurdles that must be
cleared in mounting and conducting social experiments in complex real-
world settings: selection bias, contamination, obtaining informed con-
sent, establishing good working relations with program operators,
collecting full and accurate data, locating respondents (especially
controls), and avoiding sample attrition are examples.252 Richard P. Nathan
What Is Unclear?
Despite the fact that the experiments worked from a technical point
of view, it is not clear that they achieved their purpose as an input to
government policymaking. Actually, this question has two parts: (1) Did
politicians (broadly defined to include elected and appointed officials
and the representatives of major organizations) use the results of this
demonstration research? and (2) Did the results of the research achieve
the aim of the sponsors, which was to advance the idea of a negative
income tax?
One interpretation is that the results of the experiments were used,
but not in the way the sponsors of the research intended. I believe that
the very fact that the experiments were being planned and conducted
had an educational effect in the early Nixon years and on balance
advanced the concept of a negative income tax (although mistakenly).
However, later on in the Carter period the results of the experiments
tended to undermine the negative income tax idea. These negative po-
litical results of the experiments -- that is, negative for a negative income
tax -- may have destroyed the chances of enacting comprehensive
welfare reform with a welfare reduction rate set at a level that would not
undermine the work incentives of recipients.
What Was Presumed?
As already mentioned, the historical record suggests that the spon-
sors of the experiments saw them as a way to dispel the belief that a
negative income tax "would bring about a large increase in idleness
among those who would otherwise have worked.’’17 Heather Ross,
working first at the Council of Economic Advisers and later at Health,
Education, and Welfare and at Brookings,18 developed the original plan
for the demonstrations. However, even in this period, there was con-
siderable uneasiness about these experiments. When the time came to
announce the start of the experiments, officials (particularly Sargent
Shriver as head of the Office of Economic Opportunity) had second
thoughts. Shriver decided to proceed, but to do so on a low-key basis.19
The initial contract for the New Jersey experiment was financed using
previously appropriated research funds, and its announcement was
withheld until after Congress had recessed for Labor Day in 1967.
In my view, it is perfectly appropriate for the sponsors of social
science research and for the lead researchers to believe in the programs
they are testing. This is actually easier if their research involves random
assignment, which has the effect of insulating demonstration research-
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this way reduces the problem of bias toward the tested plan on the part
of both research sponsors and researchers. The problem was not that the
negative income tax experiments, as defined in a limited way, were
poorly done, although there were important difficulties along the way.
The problem lies in an often neglected area for social policy writing,
involving the connection between the research process and the political
process. The final section of this paper addresses the implications of the
negative income tax experiments for public policy research.
Implications for Policy Research
The fact that the findings of the income maintenance experiments
undercut rather than supported the case for a negative income tax is not
a bad outcome. While it is no doubt of little comfort to the originators of
these experiments, this outcome speaks well for the integrity of large-
scale social experiments. Nevertheless, I believe that on balance these
particular experiments were not well advised. The main reason for this
conclusion involves the conundrum of the negative income tax. The cost
of covering millions of additional people under an income maintenance
scheme presented a policy choice that simply was not in the cards in the
latter part of the 1960s, even if the labor-supply analysis from the
experiments had revealed no adverse or even a positive work-incentive
effect.
There was also the related psychological dimension or stigma of
adding large numbers of new people to the welfare rolls; this subject
was not addressed in the design and conduct of the experiments. Taking
into account their underlying political values and aims, I believe the
sponsors of the negative income tax experiments allowed their research
agenda to get ahead of their political agenda. Unless large amounts of
additional money could have been obtained for a new and expanded
welfare reform system, we were -- and still are -- better served by a
multi-track welfare system. One track -- AFDC -- in many states has a
near-"adequate" benefit and a high welfare reduction rate to serve non-
working family heads. A second track that particularly aids the working
poor is the food stamp program, which in essence is a mini negative
income tax that has a relatively low reduction rate and is now almost
fully fungible. Various supplements (school lunches, Medicaid, housing
subsidies) augment this assistance in ways that expand the political
constituency for aiding the nation’s most controversial dependent
population.
In my view, such a multi-track system of different strokes for dif-
ferent folks is intellectually preferable to a negative income tax, absent
the willingness on the part of the society to make a major new resource
commitment (in the range of $20 billion to $25 billion) to income254 Richard P. Nathan
redistribution to the poor. Farmers, grocers, doctors, hospitals, builders,
realtors, and educators (for school lunches, compensatory education,
and college scholarships, for example) all have a stake in helping the
poor under current conditions -- or at least they perceive that they do.
In this context, one function of the negative income tax experiments
was to teach these lessons. Unfortunately, however, this is not a cost-
effective teaching strategy. I conclude that the experiments were un-
wise, but that the idea of social experiments with random assignment
which they introduced is a good one. In particular, I believe one of the
main implications of the negative income tax experiments for policy
research is that experiments of more selective service-type policy
initiatives are to be preferred over demonstrations of universal income-
transfer schemes (for example, cash, health insurance, housing). The
problems with testing universal income-transfer schemes are twofold:
(1) the underlying value issues are bigger and more difficult to deal with
than in the case of tests of variants of social service programs; and (2) the
effect of a new policy on behavior is more likely to be pervasive and
important in the case of a universal and highly visible new program like
a negative income tax than in the case of service~type programs. Subse-
quent experiments in the field of social policy, notably those conducted
by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation as described in
the paper for this conference by Barbara Blum, have benefited greatly
from the earlier experience of the negative income tax experiments.
Another critical research implication of the experiments, brought
out in papers and discussions by Lee Rainwater and others at this con-
ference, is that once we decide to embark on a social experiment we
should seek to learn more from such endeavors than we did in this case.
The dominance of economists in the negative income tax experiment
had important consequences. In leaving out sociologists, psychologists,
and political scientists as major players, the sponsors of the experi-
ments, in effect, left out variables from the research equation that are im-
portant both to politicians and to society as a whole.
In sum, the fact that the negative income tax experiments worked is
important for the future, despite my conclusion that the subject for
experimentation was in this case not well advised. The planning of
demonstration research involves both art and science. The negative
income tax experiments, as the first such effort of this type, led the way
in developing both the capacity and the sensitivity necessary to the more
effective use of social experimentation as an input to the governmental
process.LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 255
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